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 Defendants paint a picture of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(the “Act”) as a common-sense constitutionally sound system which will “stem a 
crisis in the health care market that has threatened the vitality of the U.S. 
economy.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 16). However, when the layers of glossy paint are 
peeled away what remains below the rhetoric is a rotten law, which, if allowed to 
stand, would undermine the very notion of limited government and enumerated 
powers of Congress. The Administration insists that Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005) supplanted United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) as controlling precedent for the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, ignoring the fact that the Raich plaintiffs conceded that 
Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the underlying 
statute. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. Defendants also fail to address the fact that the 
Individual and Employer Mandates will not provide a guaranteed reduction in the 
number of uninsured Americans or that the penalty for failing to purchase 
insurance will not create revenue that will help reduce the number of uninsured 
Americans. The Administration presumes that everyone who does not have health 
insurance does not pay his medical bills and that everyone who has health 
insurance pays every cent of his health care expenses and will never face financial 
problems related to medical expenses. (Appellees‟ Brief, at 51, “The Act will 
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protect people like plaintiffs from the risk of being left destitute by catastrophic 
medical expenses”). None of these premises is factually or legally supportable, 
leaving Defendants with no foundation for their claims that the Mandates are 
constitutionally valid exercises of Congress‟ enumerated powers. Defendants offer 
no analysis of the problems posed by the Mandates‟ infringement upon Plaintiffs‟ 
fundamental rights, choosing instead to simply dismiss those claims out of hand. 
Defendants‟ cavalier attitude toward Plaintiffs‟ First Amendment and Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claims does not erase the very significant 
infringement upon fundamental rights embodied within the Mandate provisions.   
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANTS’ ATTEMPT TO 
JUSTIFY CONGRESS’ UNPRECEDENTED EXPANSION OF THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
 A. Defendants Cannot Shoehorn The Individual Mandate 
Within The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause Decisions.  
 
 Faced with the unprecedented expansion of Congress‟ Commerce Clause 
authority posed by the Mandates, Defendants use linguistic sleight of hand to try to 
convince this Court that the Mandates‟ unsupportable intrusion into the private 
financial affairs of Americans is nothing more than an extension of Congress‟ 
long-standing oversight of the interstate insurance and health care markets. 
Defendants use feats of logical sleight of hand to try to convince this Court that the 
Mandates will, inter alia, cure the ailing health care system, make health insurance 
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more available and affordable and save Americans from economic devastation 
brought on by catastrophic medical bills. (Appellees‟ Brief at 28, 51). In reality, 
however, the Mandates will not work the miracles promised by Defendants. When 
the curtain is pulled back from Defendants‟ presentation and the faulty premises 
upon which these conclusions are based are revealed, it is apparent that the 
Mandates are not cure-alls, but unprecedented power grabs that fall far outside of 
the boundaries the Supreme Court has placed upon Congress‟ Commerce Clause 
power.  
1. Defendants Cannot Use Raich To Bypass Lopez And 
Morrison And Rely Upon Wickard. 
 Defendants continue to rely upon Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) as 
controlling precedent for their conclusion that the Mandates are valid under the 
Commerce Clause. By clinging to Raich, Defendants can attempt to return to the 
expansive definition of the Commerce Clause under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942) and by-pass the intervening narrowing of Congress‟ power under Lopez 
and Morrison. Defendants‟ reliance upon Raich and Wickard is misplaced because 
regulating the Raich plaintiffs‟ active growing and cultivating of medical 
marijuana or Mr. Filburn‟s active growing and cultivating of wheat is not 
analogous to Plaintiffs‟ inaction in failing to purchase health insurance. See Id. at 
127-128; Raich, 525 U.S. at 22. More importantly, Raich is inapposite because it 
did not involve a facial Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 23. In Raich the 
Case: 10-2347     Document: 79      Date Filed: 03/04/2011      Page: 9
4 
 
plaintiffs did not, as Plaintiffs do here, challenge Congress‟ authority to enact the 
underlying statute. Id. at 15. “Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage 
of the CSA [Controlled Substances Act], as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress‟ commerce power.” Id. 
“Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an 
unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.” Id. Consequently, Raich did 
not, as Defendants claim, effectively overrule Lopez and Morrison and re-establish 
the broadened definition of the Commerce Clause announced in Wickard. Raich‟s 
conclusion that “when Congress decides that the total incidence of a practice poses 
a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class” must be understood 
as referring to the Raich plaintiffs‟ request to excise their economic activity from a 
concededly valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, not, as Defendants claim, an 
expansion of Commerce Clause authority. Defendants‟ failure to recognize that 
distinction renders their conclusion that the Mandates are valid under Raich 
untenable. The distinctions between Raich, this case and the most recent Supreme 
Court cases analyzing facial Commerce Clause challenges, i.e., Lopez and 
Morrison, mean that Defendants‟ attempt to resurrect the pre-Lopez expansive 
definition of the Commerce Clause under Wickard is unavailing, leaving 
Defendants with Lopez and Morrison as controlling precedent. But even Wickard 
and Raich cannot save the Act, because both these cases involved active growing 
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and consumption; whereas here Plaintiffs are doing absolutely nothing. The 
Wickard and Raich plaintiffs were reached by regulation because of their voluntary 
activity, but the Act here seeks to reach Plaintiffs merely because they lawfully 
exist. 
 When viewed under the more limiting standards of Lopez and Morrison, the 
individual Mandates fall far outside the permissible limits of Congress‟ power to 
regulate interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (accepting the 
defendants‟ arguments would convert congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the states). Defendants try 
to escape that conclusion by engaging in semantic gymnastics aimed at recasting 
the non-economic inactivity of not purchasing health insurance as an economic 
activity suitable for congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
Defendants portray the Mandates as regulating “the means of payment for services 
in the interstate health care market,” preventing “the consumption of health care 
services without payment,” restricting “the shifting of costs to other market 
participants” and comporting with “broad principles of economic practicality” 
under which this Court is urged to overlook the fact that through the Mandates 
Congress is, for the first time, seeking to regulate non-economic inactivity. 
(Appellees‟ Brief at 24, 40, 41). No matter how Defendants portray the Mandates, 
the truth is that Congress is compelling Americans who have chosen not to engage 
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in commerce to become active market participants by purchasing a government-
defined health insurance policy or paying a penalty. There is no legal precedent for 
such an intrusion into the private financial affairs of American citizens.  
 Even Wickard, which upheld the regulation of the private economic activity 
of growing wheat, and Raich, which upheld the regulation of the private economic 
activity of growing medical marijuana, did not reach as far as Congress is seeking 
to reach here. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128, Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. In each of those 
cases, the Court found that the economic activities engaged in by the plaintiffs 
were sufficiently connected to interstate commerce to warrant congressional 
regulation.
1
 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128, Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. By contrast, 
possessing a gun near a school and committing a violent crime against a female are 
not subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause because their 
relationship to economic activity is too attenuated. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-568 
(possession of a gun near a school); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (violent crime 
against women). Similarly, Plaintiffs‟ inaction regarding health insurance is 
dissimilar to the taking of red wolves on private land that this Court held is 
                                           
1
  Again, it should be emphasized that in Raich the plaintiffs conceded that 
Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Controlled 
Substances Act, but were seeking a special “carve out” exception for medical 
marijuana grown in California. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. Plaintiffs do not concede 
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Mandates, 
making Raich wholly inapposite. However, if Raich were applicable, the economic 
activity of planting, raising and cultivating medical marijuana would distinguish it 
from this case.    
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“regulable economic and commercial activity as understood by current Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.” Gibbs v. Babbitt  214 F.3d 483, 492-493 (4th Cir. 2000). 
Unlike Plaintiffs‟ inaction here, the conduct regulated in Gibbs involved voluntary 
actions, i.e., the taking of wolves, for commercial and economic benefit, i.e., 
protection of valuable livestock and crops, in a way that affected interstate 
commerce, i.e. tourism, trade and research. Id.  
 Neither Defendants‟ newly minted characterizations of the Mandates nor 
their recitation of statistics, opinions and conclusions from scholarly articles and 
congressional reports (none of which is in evidence and most of which is 
inadmissible) alters the conclusion that the Mandates far exceed the boundaries 
that the Supreme Court has placed on Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority.  
2. Defendants’ Contention That The “Uniqueness” Of 
The Health Care Market Warrants Congress’ 
Expansion of the Commerce Clause Is Unsupportable. 
 Defendants build their defense of the Mandates upon a claim that the health 
care market is somehow “unique” so that Congress is justified in extending its 
Commerce Clause power to, for the first time, compel people to purchase a product 
or be penalized. Judge Vinson of the Northern District of Florida cogently revealed 
the fallacy of that argument in his opinion that declared the Individual Mandate 
unconstitutional and determined that it was not severable from the Act so that the 
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entire Act is unconstitutional.
2
 State of Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011). Judge Vinson persuasively refuted the 
same issues Defendants have raised in this case, including that Plaintiffs cannot 
“opt out” of health care,  that hospitals are legally required to provide emergency 
care and that unpaid medical costs are shifted to third parties. Id. at *18-*25.  
The defendants contend that there are three unique elements of the 
health care market which, when viewed cumulatively and in 
combination, belie the claim that the uninsured are inactive. First, as 
living and breathing human beings who are always susceptible to 
sudden and unpredictable illness and injury, no one can “opt out” of 
the health care market. Second, if and when health services are 
sought, hospitals are required by law to provide care, regardless of 
inability to pay. And third, if the costs incurred cannot be paid (which 
they frequently cannot, given the high cost of medical care), they are 
passed along (cost-shifted) to third parties, which has economic 
implications for everyone. Congress found that the uninsured received 
approximately $43 billion in “uncompensated care” in 2008 alone. 
These three things, according to the defendants and various health 
care industry experts and scholars on whom they rely, are “replicated 
in no other market” and defeat the argument that uninsured 
individuals are inactive. 
 First, it is not at all clear whether or why the three allegedly 
unique factors of the health care market are Constitutionally 
significant. What if only one of the three factors identified by the 
defendants is present? After all, there are lots of markets–especially if 
defined broadly enough–that people cannot “opt out” of. For example, 
everyone must participate in the food market. Instead of attempting to 
control wheat supply by regulating the acreage and amount of wheat a 
                                           
2
 Plaintiffs realize that Judge Vinson‟s opinion is not binding on this Court, 
but offers his reasoned analysis as a response to Defendants‟ recurring reference to 
the purported uniqueness of the health care market as a justification for the 
Mandates. The Florida case addresses only the Individual Mandate, but Judge 
Vinson‟s analysis is equally apropos for the Employer Mandate. 
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farmer could grow as in Wickard, under this logic, Congress could 
more directly raise too-low wheat prices merely by increasing demand 
through mandating that every adult purchase and consume wheat 
bread daily, rationalized on the grounds that because everyone must 
participate in the market for food, non-consumers of wheat bread 
adversely affect prices in the wheat market. Or, as was discussed 
during oral argument, Congress could require that people buy and 
consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required 
purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but also 
because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus 
more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system. 
Similarly, because virtually no one can be divorced from the 
transportation market, Congress could require that everyone above a 
certain income threshold buy a General Motors automobile–now 
partially government-owned–because those who do not buy GM cars 
(or those who buy foreign cars) are adversely impacting commerce 
and a taxpayer-subsidized business. 
I pause here to emphasize that the foregoing is not an irrelevant and 
fanciful “parade of horribles.” Rather, these are some of the serious 
concerns implicated by the individual mandate that are being 
discussed and debated by legal scholars. For example, in the course of 
defending the Constitutionality of the individual mandate, and 
responding to the same concerns identified above, often-cited law 
professor and dean of the University of California Irvine School of 
Law Erwin Chemerinsky has opined that although “what people 
choose to eat well might be regarded as a personal liberty” (and thus 
unregulable), “Congress could use its commerce power to require 
people to buy cars.” See ReasonTV, Wheat, Weed, and Obamacare: 
How the Commerce Clause Made Congress All-Powerful, August 25, 
2010, available at: http:// reason.tv/video/show/wheat-weed-and-
obamacare-how-t. When I mentioned this to the defendants‟ attorney 
at oral argument, he allowed for the possibility that “maybe Dean 
Chemerinsky is right.” See Tr. at 69. Therefore, the potential for this 
assertion of power has received at least some theoretical consideration 
and has not been ruled out as Constitutionally implausible.
3
 
                                           
3
  This directly counters Defendants‟ contention that Plaintiffs‟ similar 
illustrations regarding the consequences of adopting Defendants expansive view of 
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Id. at *23-*24.  
In alluding to these same general concerns, another court has observed 
that requiring advance purchase of health insurance based on a future 
contingency that will substantially affect commerce could also “apply 
to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions. This broad 
definition of the economic activity subject to congressional regulation 
lacks logical limitation and is unsupported by Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.” See Virginia[v Sebelius], supra, 728 F.Supp.2d  [768] 
at 781 [(E.D. Va. 2010)].  
Id. at *25. Judge Vinson added:  
[T]he contention that Commerce Clause power should be upheld 
merely because the government and its experts or scholars claim that 
it is being exercised to address a „particularly acute‟ problem that is 
„singular [ ],‟ „special,‟ and „rare‟–that is to say „unique‟–will not by 
itself win the day. Uniqueness is not an adequate limiting principle as 
every market problem is, at some level and in some respects, unique. 
If Congress asserts power that exceeds its enumerated powers, then it 
is unconstitutional, regardless of the purported uniqueness of the 
context in which it is being asserted. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, under Lopez the causal link 
between what is being regulated and its effect on interstate commerce 
cannot be attenuated and require a court “to pile inference upon 
inference,” which is, in my view, exactly what would be required to 
uphold the individual mandate. For example, in contrast to individuals 
who grow and consume marijuana or wheat (even in extremely small 
amounts), the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of 
itself, has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce 
(not “slight,” “trivial,” or “indirect,” but no impact whatsoever)–at 
least not any more so than the status of being without any particular 
good or service. If impact on interstate commerce were to be 
expressed and calculated mathematically, the status of being 
uninsured would necessarily be represented by zero. Of course, any 
other figure multiplied by zero is also zero. Consequently, the impact 
must be zero, and of no effect on interstate commerce. The uninsured 
                                                                                                                                        
Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority are mere “rhetoric” which should be 
dismissed as meaningless. (Appellees‟ Brief at 49-51)  
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can only be said to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in 
the manner as described by the defendants: (i) if they get sick or 
injured; (ii) if they are still uninsured at that specific point in time; 
(iii) if they seek medical care for that sickness or injury; (iv) if they 
are unable to pay for the medical care received; and (v) if they are 
unable or unwilling to make payment arrangements directly with the 
health care provider, or with assistance of family, friends, and 
charitable groups, and the costs are thereafter shifted to others. In my 
view, this is the sort of piling “inference upon inference” rejected in 
Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 567, and subsequently described in 
Morrison as “unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution‟s 
enumeration of powers.” Supra, 529 U.S. at 615. 
 
Id. at *25-*26. “In short, the defendants‟ argument that people without health 
insurance are actively engaged in interstate commerce based on the purported 
“unique” features of the much broader health care market is neither factually 
convincing nor legally supportable.” Id. at *27. Defendants cannot make an 
unconstitutional law constitutional merely because they allege a crisis is looming 
or conjure up a parade of horribles. Nor can the purported good intention of 
making healthcare available and affordable make a bad law good. When all the 
rhetoric and mathematical magic fades, we are left with the basic question of 
whether Congress has the authority to force inactive citizens to purchase a 
government-defined product or pay a penalty. The answer is a simple “No!” 
3. Defendants Cannot Use The Deference Accorded To 
Congressional Findings To Justify Congress’ Coercive 
Intrusion Into Private Financial Matters.  
 Defendants also attempt to justify Congress‟ unprecedented reach into the 
private financial lives of lawful citizens by alluding to the usual deference 
Case: 10-2347     Document: 79      Date Filed: 03/04/2011      Page: 17
12 
 
accorded Congress‟ choice of the means used to attain the end of regulating 
interstate commerce. (Appellees‟ Brief, at 32-33). “Governing precedent leaves no 
room for plaintiffs‟ invitation to override Congress‟ judgment about the 
appropriate means to achieve its legitimate objectives.” Id. at 32. Defendants argue 
this Court should merely look at “whether the means chosen are „reasonably 
adapted‟ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power‟ or under 
other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.” Id. 
at 32 (citing United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010)). Not 
surprisingly, Defendants conclude that the Mandates are reasonable means to attain 
Congress‟ goal of ameliorating “a crisis in the health care market that has 
threatened the vitality of the U.S. economy.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 16). In fact, 
however, the Mandates do nothing to address the problems Congress sought to 
address. Even if the ends Congress sought in enacting the Act were legitimate 
objectives under the Commerce Clause (which they are not), the means enacted to 




                                           
4
  Plaintiffs do not agree with Defendants‟ characterization of the appropriate 
standard for review of congressional enactments. Defendants overstate the 
deference accorded to legislative findings in support of legislation. Following 
Defendants‟ position would make this Court little more than a rubber stamp for 
anything members of Congress might come up with to attempt to justify 
legislation. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected such a standard. Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 614. “Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce 
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 Defendants have imbued the Mandates with attributes that are not present in 
the Act. The Mandates cannot deliver the results promised by Defendants and are 
not reasonable means to meet the ends described in the Act, even if those ends 
were legitimate. Defendants claim that “the minimum coverage provisions” will 
“prevent health care consumers from waiting to buy insurance until they are sick or 
injured.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 30). In fact, there is nothing in the Mandates to 
prevent such last-minute purchases. Section 1501 of the Act provides that 
individuals must demonstrate that they have health insurance which meets the 
government‟s definition of “minimum essential coverage” or pay a penalty. 26 
U.S.C. §5000A. Section 1513 of the Act dictates that, with limited exceptions, 
employers must offer employees health insurance coverage that meets what the 
government determines to be “minimum essential coverage” at what the 
government determines is affordable or pay significant penalties. 26 U.S.C. 
§4980H. Under either provision, individuals or employers could pay the penalty 
and decide to not purchase health insurance at all, or purchase health insurance 
only when they get sick or injured and be in compliance with the law. Defendants 
claim that the Mandates will prevent uninsured people from “externalizing” their 
                                                                                                                                        
sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is 
ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally 
only by this Court.” Id. None of the cases cited by Defendants gives Congress 
carte blanche to enact laws (including means and ends) which exceed their 
enumerated powers. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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costs. (Appellees‟ Brief at 34). Again, this is based upon the faulty premise that the 
Mandates will result in every individual being covered by health insurance when 
the Mandates merely provide that individuals purchase insurance or pay a penalty. 
According to Defendants, the Mandates will ensure that those who use health care 
services “will not add to the staggering burden of uncompensated health care 
costs.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 50). This assertion is based upon the faulty premise 
that every person who is not presently insured will become insured under the 
Mandates, when in fact the provisions only require a choice between an insurance 
policy and paying a penalty. If an individual decides to pay the penalty, which is 
not designated to be applied to purchasing insurance, then he could still remain 
uninsured and perhaps fail to pay for health care services. Defendants‟ statement is 
built upon the further fallacy that everyone who does not purchase health insurance 
does not pay for his health care costs through other means and thereby shifts the 
burden of his health care unto those who have insurance. Defendants offer no 
evidence to support the proposition that those who do not have health insurance do 
not pay their medical bills while those with insurance pay every penny. Finally, 
Defendants claim that the Mandates guarantee that people like plaintiffs will be 
protected from the risk of being “left destitute by catastrophic medical expenses.” 
(Appellees‟ Brief at 51, citing statistic that 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies 
are caused in part by medical expenses). This conclusion builds upon the fallacies 
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that every uninsured person will have health insurance and that everyone who does 
not purchase health insurance does not pay his medical bills, and adds another 
fallacy that those who have health insurance will have 100 percent of all medical 
costs paid for so that they will never face significant medical costs that could 
create financial hardship. 
 Neither the words of the Mandates nor any of the scholarly opinions and 
reports cited by Defendants support their conclusion that the Mandates will solve 
economic problems associated with health care costs, increase supply and demand 
for health insurance, and decrease the number of uninsured Americans. 
Defendants‟ logically unsupportable arguments are wholly inadequate to justify 
Congress‟ unprecedented expansion of the Commerce Clause.  
4. Other Governmental Regulatory Schemes Are Not 
Analogous To Congress’ Unprecedented Attempt To 
Compel Participation in Commerce.  
 Defendants attempt to defend the unprecedented expansion of Commerce 
Clause authority by pointing to examples of what they believe are analogous 
regulations of passive conduct and claiming that the Mandates are merely logical 
extensions of those regulations.
5
 The cited statutory schemes are not analogous, 
however, and only serve to emphasize the unprecedented nature of Congress‟ 
                                           
5
  This argument seems to contradict Defendants‟ argument that the health care 
market is “unique.” If it is unique, then these comparisons to other industries 
should be irrelevant.  
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attempt to compel citizens to purchase a product and penalize those who refuse. 
Defendants cite two statutory provisions, The Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 38, 1 
Stat. 264, and federal laws regulating child pornography, 18 U.S.C. §2252(c), as 
examples of Congress regulating inactivity. However, neither statute supports the 
proposition that Congress can force a person who has purposely not purchased a 
product to purchase a government-defined product under threat of sanction. The 
Second Militia Act was an early form of the draft, establishing that every male 
between 18 and 45 was enrolled in the militia. 1 Stat. 264 at Section I. As part of 
their responsibilities each man had to “provide himself” with the weapons and 
supplies needed if he should be called into service. Id. The colonial-era law did not 
require that all males purchase certain government-approved firearms from a third 
party or pay a penalty, as the Mandates do here with regard to health insurance. 
Moreover, this law had nothing to do with the Commerce Clause.  
The child pornography statute penalizes “knowing possession, transmission, 
or receipt” of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. §2252(c). Knowing possession, 
transmission or receipt connotes an affirmative, deliberate action to acquire or 
transmit something, wholly unlike Plaintiffs‟ failure to act to purchase health 
insurance. 
  In Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935), the Supreme Court 
found that Congress‟ power to control the currency included the ability to compel 
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all of those who had gold bullion, coins and certificates to exchange them for paper 
currency. As was true in Raich, the plaintiff in Nortz conceded that Congress had 
the power to enact the underlying legislation, but wanted a specific ruling 
regarding the amount of compensation to which he was entitled. Nortz, 294 U.S. at 
328. While the statute in Nortz referred to compelling citizens to do something, it 
did not, as the Mandates do here, compel those who had taken no action to take 
action or pay a penalty. Id. The affected citizens in Nortz had voluntary engaged in 
an economic transaction–acquiring gold bullion, coins, or certificates–and, as a 
consequence, were subject to congressional regulation. Id. The Court did not say 
that Congress could force those who did not own gold to purchase gold and then 
trade it in for currency. Id. Neither can Congress here force Plaintiffs and others to 
purchase a health insurance policy in order to become part of the insurance 
industry regulated by Congress.  
 This Court‟s cases upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances 
(FACE) Act also do not support Defendants‟ argument that Congress can regulate 
non-economic inactivity, but further illustrate that Congress‟ Commerce Clause 
authority extends to activities which affect interstate commerce. American Life 
League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995); Hoffman v. Hunt,  126 F.3d 
575, 587-588 (4th Cir. 1997). In American Life League, this Court found that the 
activities of violence, threats of force, and physical obstructions aimed at persons 
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seeking or providing reproductive health services, while not themselves economic, 
substantially affected the interstate commercial activities of abortion clinics to 
warrant regulation under the Commerce Clause. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 
647. In Hoffman, this Court re-examined the FACE Act in light of the Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Lopez, and found that it did not attempt to regulate non-
economic inactivity as did the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez. Hoffman, 126 
F.3d at 587.  
FACE does not regulate the provision of reproductive health care. 
Rather, it regulates the use of force, threat of force, or physical 
obstruction to intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with persons 
because they are or have been obtaining or providing reproductive 
health care services. Although this regulated activity is not itself 
commercial or economic in nature, it is closely connected with, and 
has a direct and profound effect on, the interstate commercial market 
in reproductive health care services. As the congressional reports 
accompanying FACE make clear, several aspects of interstate 
commerce are directly and substantially affected by the regulated 
conduct. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized words are critical to the distinction drawn 
by this Court, as they exemplify the essential differentiation between what can be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause, i.e., voluntary and deliberate actions 
encompassed in the words use, activity and conduct, and what cannot, i.e., inaction 
such as being in possession of something (Lopez) or not purchasing a product (the 
Mandates here). American Life League and Hoffman are further examples of the 
long-standing proposition that the Commerce Clause can be used to regulate 
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activities that affect interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“[T]hus 
far in our Nation‟s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of 
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 This Court‟s validation of prior property owner liability under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) also does not support Defendants‟ argument that the Mandates are a 
logical extension of existing congressional regulation. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. 
Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992). Nurad did not involve the 
Commerce Clause, but analyzed the question of the extent of strict liability for the 
disposal of hazardous materials on property. Id. This Court found that CERCLA 
“plainly imposes liability on a party who owns a facility at the time hazardous 
waste leaks from an underground storage tank on the premises.” Id. at 840. This 
Court rejected the former owner‟s attempt to avoid liability by differentiating 
between prior passive ownership of contaminated property and active present 
ownership. Id. at 845. Under the view proffered by the prior owner, “an owner 
could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an environmental hazard festers 
on his property. Such an owner could insulate himself from liability by virtue of 
his passivity, so long as he transfers the property before any response costs are 
incurred.” Id. Such a result would be anomalous to Congress‟ purpose in enacting 
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CERCLA. Id. at 845-846. While this Court rejected the concept of “passive” 
versus “active” ownership, it did not, as Defendants imply, embrace the idea that 
Congress can regulate non-economic inactivity. Property owners subject to 
CERCLA are not inactive non-participants as are Plaintiffs here. Instead, 
purchasing property and operating a business from which hazardous materials 
leaked involves voluntary conduct that produces an economic benefit to the person 
or industry. The prior property owner in Nurad voluntarily purchased a piece of 
property, i.e., participated in an economic transaction, and held or used it in a way 
that created economic benefit. Regardless of whether he actively deposited 
hazardous materials on the land, he owned the land and realized profit from the 
sale, and so was engaged in economic activity. By contrast, Plaintiffs here have not 
voluntarily agreed to purchase health insurance from which they realize economic 
benefit. Congress could not compel the parties in Nurad to purchase real property 
in order to have them liable for contamination and it cannot compel Plaintiffs here 
to purchase health insurance in order to regulate their personal spending choices.  
 Similarly, when the Supreme Court found that the Commerce Clause 
permitted Congress to require local motels and restaurants to serve black 
customers, it did not say that Congress could require that individuals purchase 
motels and restaurants in order to increase the supply of facilities available to 
blacks. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
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Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Consequently, these precedents do 
not, as Defendants imply, support the position that Congress can require that 
individuals purchase health insurance policies in order to increase the number of 
insured Americans who can be regulated.  
 None of the statutory schemes Defendants offer as examples of Congress‟ 
power to regulate Plaintiffs‟ private financial affairs do what the Mandates do here 
– compel citizens to engage in a government-defined financial transaction or be 
penalized for failing to do so. Despite Defendants‟ best efforts to prove otherwise, 
there simply is no precedent for the limitless expansion of the Commerce Clause 
that is reflected in the Mandates.  
5. Defendants’ Blurring Of The Lines Between 
Regulating Participants And Compelling Participation 
Does Not Validate Congress’ Invalid Assertion Of 
Authority In The Mandates.  
In a further effort to blur the distinction between permissible and 
impermissible Commerce Clause regulations, Defendants point to numerous 
instances in which courts have upheld regulations of economic transactions in the 
health care, health insurance and similar national industries. Defendants fail to 
recognize the difference between regulating those who voluntarily engage in 
economic transactions and compelling people who have not engaged in any 
transactions to purchase a product so that they can be regulated.  
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Defendants point to the fact that health insurance is sold by national or 
regional companies that operate interstate and cover costs for supplies, drugs and 
equipment shipped in interstate commerce, presumably implying that those 
attributes justify compelling all individuals to participate in the industry. 
(Appellees‟ Brief at 44). Of course, the mere existence of a national industry and 
the mere existence of an individual who might someday partake in the industry 
does not justify compelling the individual to participate at the risk of financial 
penalty. Defendants state that Congress can regulate health care under the 
Commerce Clause because diseases can spread rapidly so that people can suddenly 
need health care services far from home, and consumers travel out of state to 
receive health care services. (Appellees‟ Brief at 45). However, these hypothetical 
possibilities do not give Congress authority to compel people to purchase a 
government-defined health insurance policy or pay a penalty.  
Defendants cite Hoffman and Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 
313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002) as evidence that this Court has held that Congress can 
regulate “the cross-border challenges associated with health care and other 
markets.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 47). In Freilich, this Court recognized that since 
hospitals are regularly engaged in interstate commerce, performing services for 
out-of-state patients and generating revenues from out-of-state sources, Congress 
has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact statutes governing physician 
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peer review. Freilich, 313 F.3d at 213. However, the fact that abortion clinics or 
hospitals, which voluntarily engage in economic transactions, can be subject to 
regulation does not support Defendants‟ conclusion that Congress can force 
someone to engage in similar transactions so that they can be regulated. The mere 
fact that individuals might someday use health care facilities regulated by federal 
law does not provide Congress with the power to cast a regulatory net over those 
individuals‟ private financial affairs.  
Similarly, the fact that the Supreme Court has upheld national reforms for 
interstate concerns in other industries does not create in Congress the power to 
compel those who do not participate in the health insurance industry to participate 
or be penalized. (Appellees‟ Brief at 47, citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (upholding the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act under the Commerce Clause); United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); 
Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social 
Security system as a national reform for problems associated with state-regulated 
insurance)). It is undisputed that Congress can enact federal laws to provide 
consistency and national reforms for interstate industries, including health 
insurance, but that undisputed fact does not grant Congress the right to compel 
citizens to become part of those industries against their will.  
Case: 10-2347     Document: 79      Date Filed: 03/04/2011      Page: 29
24 
 
B. Congress’ Long-standing Regulation Of Employers Who Voluntarily 
Provide Insurance Benefits To Employers Does Not Grant Congress 
The Right To Compel Employers To Offer Government-Defined 
Benefits That The Government Defines As Affordable. 
 Defendants cavalierly dismiss Plaintiffs‟ challenges to the Employer 
Mandate by referring to the various statutes under which Congress has regulated 
the content and availability of group health insurance plans offered by large 
employers. (Appellees‟ Brief at 53). However, as Plaintiffs explained in their 
Opening Brief, the fact that Congress can regulate employers who voluntarily 
agree to offer health insurance and other benefits to their employees does not mean 
that Congress can take the further step of requiring that employers offer health 
insurance to their employees or pay a penalty, nor the further steps of defining 
what coverage must be offered and whether the coverage is “affordable.” 
(Appellants‟ Brief at 32-37).  
Defendants entirely miss the point of the argument that regulation of wages 
and hours under Darby and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937) does not confer upon Congress the right to dictate what benefits will be 
offered. Plaintiffs‟ argument is not that the Employer Mandate is unconstitutional 
because it involves a contract with a third party, but because it seeks to assert the 
authority to dictate that employers will offer certain benefits defined by the 
government to their employees or be penalized. (Appellants‟ Brief, at 25-26). 
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Defendants cannot cite a single case to support that unprecedented assertion of 
authority. 
II. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO EFFECTIVELY REFUTE THE VALIDITY 
OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS.  
Defendants summarily dismiss Plaintiffs‟ First Amendment claims as 
“insubstantial,” claiming that the Mandates “easily withstand rational basis 
review.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 62). They base that conclusion upon their 
unsubstantiated arguments that the Mandates regulate economic activity (“means 
of payment for services obtained in the health care market”) and that Plaintiffs are 
active participants in the health care market subject to congressional authority. 
(Appellees‟ Brief at 62).  
Defendants also offer the conclusory statement that the Mandates are neutral 
laws of general applicability under Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)  with no analysis of  what those terms mean 
and how the Mandates comport with the definition. As Plaintiffs explain in their 
Opening Brief, the Mandates are the antithesis of neutral laws of general 
applicability which do not survive strict scrutiny. (Appellants‟ Brief at 44-50). 
Defendants attempt to defend the limited religious exemptions to the Mandates by 
pointing to the court-approved Internal Revenue Code section upon which the 
definition of exempted religious sects was based as if the approval of that provision 
for income tax purposes made its terms immune from challenge in every other 
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context. (Appellees‟ Brief at 60-61). As Plaintiffs explained in their Opening Brief, 
merely alluding to the underlying I.R.C. section does not validate the exemptions 
under the Constitution. (Appellants‟ Brief at 52-53).  
Defendants do not even attempt to analyze Plaintiffs‟ Equal Protection, 
Establishment Clause or RFRA claims. Their failure to address those claims is a 
telling admission of their validity, and their silence waives any argument to the 
contrary. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT AND PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE 
ESTABLISHED THAT THE MANDATES ARE PENALTIES, NOT 
TAXES ENACTED PURSUANT TO CONGRESS’ POWER TO TAX 
AND SPEND FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE. 
 Defendants devote considerable time to an issue that they admit was not 
addressed by the district court nor raised by Plaintiffs in their appeal. Not only is 
the issue of Congress‟ power to enact the Mandates under the Taxing and Spending 
Clause not before this Court, but both the district court and President Obama have 
held that the Mandates are not taxes.  
 As Judge Vinson observed, to date, every court to consider the issue of 
whether the payments for non-compliance with the Mandates is a tax or penalty 
(even those that have ruled in favor of the federal government) has rejected 
Defendants‟ argument that they are taxes. Florida v. H.H.S., 2011 WL 285683 at 
*2, n.4 (citing Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL 
223010, at *9-*12 (M.D.Pa. Jan.24, 2011); Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 
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768, 786-88 (E.D.Va. 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 
2010 WL 4860299, at *9-* 11 (W.D.Va. Nov.30, 2010); U.S. Citizens Assoc. v. 
Sebelius, ---F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 4947043, at *5 (N.D.Ohio Nov.22, 2010); 
Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 890-91 
(E.D.Mich.2010)).  
 More importantly, President Obama, the Act‟s chief proponent and the one 
who signed the bill into law has emphatically stated that the payments are not 
taxes. “For us to say you have to take responsibility to get health insurance is 
absolutely not a tax increase,” and “Nobody considers that a tax increase.” 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/20/obama.health.care/index.html (last 
visited January 11, 2011). For Defendants to now claim that the payments are in 
fact taxes, while perhaps convenient for trying to validate the law, is disingenuous 
and contrary to established precedent. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs explained in their 
Opening Brief, both Congress‟ reference to the payments as “penalties” while 
using the term “taxes” elsewhere in the Act, along with the legislative history of 
the Act, demonstrate that Congress clearly intended that the payments would be 
penalties, not taxes. (Appellants‟ Brief, at 40-43). Therefore, this Court should 
reject Defendants‟ invitations to 1. consider the issue and 2. hold that the payments 
are taxes.  




 The Individual and Employer Mandates are unprecedented extensions of 
Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority that are legally and factually insupportable. 
The Mandates violate Plaintiffs First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights and 
rights under RFRA.   
 For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court‟s order and 
find that the Mandates are unconstitutional.  
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